Abstract In this paper we apply to multiplicative lotteries the idea of preference for "harm disaggregation" that was used for additive lotteries in order to interpret the signs of successive derivatives of a utility function. In this way, we can explain in general terms why the values of the coefficients of relative risk aversion and relative prudence are usually compared respectively to 1 and 2. We also show how these values partition the sets of risk averse and/or prudent decision makers into two subgroups.
The values of relative risk aversion and prudence: a context-free interpretation Recently, Eeckhoudt -Schlesinger (2006) have given an interpretation of the signs of successive derivatives of a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function (u(·)) by reference to a preference for harm disaggregation applied to additive lotteries. Of course, the sign of successive derivatives of u(·) already gives much information about the decision maker's preferences since it indicates the direction of various attitudes towards risks. However it is silent about the intensity of such preferences which-for the second and third derivatives-is usually characterized by the value of the coefficients of relative risk aversion (RRA) and relative prudence (RP ).
As far as RRA is concerned, the importance of its level (and of its behavior with respect to wealth, here denoted x) has been known for a long time.
Indeed, in a series of papers, dealing with portfolio or savings decisions as well as contingent claims models (such as Hahn (1970) , Rothschild -Stiglitz (1971) , Fishburn -Porter (1976) , Mitchell (1994) , Chiu and Madden (2007) ), it appears that many comparative statics results often depend, among other things, upon a comparison between unity and the value of the RRA coefficient
). This literature has been recently surveyed by Meyer -Meyer (2005) . Notice also that in the debate around the equity premium puzzle, the value taken by the (constant) coefficient of relative risk aversion plays a central role.
Since the concept of prudence is more recent than that of risk aversion, the notion of relative prudence (defined as −x
) is much less discussed than that of relative risk aversion. However, the scant literature that exists suggests that the benchmark value for RP is 2 (see, e.g., Hadar -Seo (1990) and Choi -Kim -Snow (2001) ). In these papers, it appears indeed that a second order dominant shift in the return of a risky asset increases its demand if RP is lower than 2. These results are summarized in Gollier (2001, pp 60-61).
As the models discussed in these papers suggest, the comparisons between RRA and unity on the one hand and between RP and 2 on the other, are indications of the intensity of risk aversion or prudence, respectively. In this sense, the benchmark values of 1 and 2 for risk aversion and prudence partition the sets of risk averse and prudent decision makers each into two subgroups: those who are a little risk averse or prudent and those who are a very risk averse or prudent.
So far, the literature has discussed these benchmark values in a specific institutional context, to wit that of competitive markets for risky assets. 1 The purpose of this paper is to present a comparison of simple lotteries which enables us to elicit in general terms whether relative risk aversion (relative prudence) exceeds the values of 1 (2) . The advantage of our approach is twofold. First, it does not rely upon a specific institutional context, and second, it is easily amenable to an experimental implementation. Our procedure applies to multiplicative lotteries an approach similar to the one adopted by Eeckhoudt -Schlesinger (2006) for additive lotteries. The transition from the additive case to the multiplicative one will enable us to interpret in simple 1 There are two exceptions that we are aware of. The first is a paper by Choi -Menezes (1985) who discuss the value of RRA from the concept of a "probability premium". More recently, White (2008) underlines the pertinence of the comparison between RP and 2 in a bargaining game framework. and general terms the benchmark values for RRA and RP .
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, after a brief exposition of the preference for harm disaggregation applied to additive lotteries, we illustrate the equivalent concept for multiplicative risks. The comparison between the two cases gives the intuition for the results presented in section 3 where the benchmark values are formally obtained. We then briefly conclude.
Multiplicative risks and the preference for harm disaggregation
In order to introduce the case of multiplicative risks, we briefly present the additive lotteries used in Eeckhoudt -Schlesinger (2006) to interpret the signs of the second and third derivatives of u(·).
Consider a decision maker endowed with an initial wealth, x, who faces the prospect of two losses (−l and −m) occurring each with probability In order to define prudence replace one of the two losses (say −l) by a zero mean risk θ which is also a harm for a risk averse decision maker. Preference for harm disaggregation then means a preference for B 1 to A 1 where
Again the additive nature of the harms leads to the conclusion that B 1 A 1 implies and is implied by prudence (u ′′′ > 0).
Turning now to the multiplicative counterpart, the two potential losses are expressed as shares of wealth denoted respectively k and r with 0 < k < 1 and 0 < r < 1. The decision maker can now apportion the harms in two different ways yielding lotteries A 2 and B 2 defined by
The preference relationship between B 2 and A 2 is now more subtle than it was for the choice between B 0 and A 0 . As for B 0 , the disaggregation of harms that occurs in B 2 gives an advantage to this lottery. However A 2 has also its own advantage: the proportional loss (1 − r) now applies to a lower wealth level (x (1 − k)) so that the expected final wealth of A 2 exceeds that of B 2 . Hence it is clear that risk aversion alone (linked to the preference for harm disaggregation) cannot justify a preference for B 2 . As we formally show in the next section, for B 2 to be preferred to A 2 , risk aversion must be strong enough in the sense that RRA ≥ 1. Another and equivalent way of interpreting the comparison between B 2 and A 2 (and also below for the comparison between B 3 and A 3 ) is to notice that B 2 contains "inner" results while A 2 has "extreme" ones. Indeed we necessarily have
Of course this feature of B 2 is attractive for risk averse decision makers.
However, as we observed before, the expected value of lottery A 2 is higher and thus RRA must exceed one for B 2 to be chosen.
To elicit the intensity of prudence, replace one of the proportional losses (say −r) by a zero mean risky return, ε ∈ [−1, ∞), which is disliked by a risk averse decision maker. Hence we now have to compare lotteries A 3 and B 3 defined as:
The harms are better apportioned in B 3 than in A 3 since the two harms never jointly occur in each of the two states of nature and this disaggregation of the two harms is positively appreciated by a prudent individual. But A 3
has-for a risk averse individual-the advantage of a lower variance 2 since the random return is applied to a lower wealth (
Hence, a decision maker will prefer B 3 only if prudence is high enough. We show in the next section that this occurs when RP ≥ 2.
Benchmark values
We now examine how the comparison between the lotteries described in section 2 are expressed in an expected utility (EU) framework and we consider the case of a risk averse (u ′′ (·) < 0) and prudent (u ′′′ (·) > 0) decision maker.
In proposition 1 we establish a one to one link between the choice among 
2 if and only if RRA(X) ≥ 1 for any wealth X > 0.
Proof. Consider a decision maker, endowed with initial wealth x, faces with the two lotteries A 2 and B 2 . Then we have that for any pair (k, r) ∈ (0, 1) 2 ,
Now define function w such that w (r, k, x)
A sufficient condition for B 2 A 2 (all r ∈ (0, 1), x ∈ R + 0 ), is then that w (r, k, x) is an increasing function in k, that is
(ii) necessity. Consider the gambles B 2 and A 2 with r = k = δ, a small positive number. Using a second order Taylor expansion of u[x(1 − δ)] and u[x(1 − δ) 2 ] around δ = 0, inequality (1) can be written as
with lim δ→0
δ 2 = 0. We have established that B 2 A 2 for any pair (k, r) ∈ (0, 1) 2 implies RRA(X) ≥ 1 for any X > 0. Another interpretation of this result can be obtained by considering the logarithmic utility function (u (x) = ln (x)) for which RRA is constant and equal to unity. 4 In this case,
If one concavifies ln (x) by taking an increasing and concave transformation h(·) (h ′ > 0 and h ′′ < 0), the resulting utility function
will exhibit a coefficient of RRA which exceeds unity (see appendix) so that B 2 is then preferred to A 2 . In fact, with the logarithmic utility the apportionment effect and the mean wealth one exactly compensate each other. By concavifying the logarithmic utility (so that RRA > 1) more weight is given to the apportionment effect and B 2 is then strictly preferred to A 2 .
We now turn, in proposition 2, to the relationship between relative prudence and the choice among lotteries B 3 and A 3 .
Proposition 2
For an EU risk averse and prudent decision maker, B 3 A 3 for any k ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈ [−1, ∞) if and only if RP (X) ≥ 2 for any wealth
Proof. Consider the possibility of a zero-mean risk of return, ε. Lottery B 3 is preferred to lottery A 3 iff for all zero-mean random variables, ε ∈ [−1, ∞), and all k in (0, 1),
We now define function w(·) such that w (k, ε, x)
Remembering that E ε = 0 and var ε > 0, we can write that B 3
(ii) necessity. Consider the gambles B 3 and A 3 with ε being a random variable taking on the values k and −k with equal probability. Let k be a small positive number. Inequality (2) then becomes
Using a third order Taylor expansion of (3) can be written as
with lim k→0
We have established that B 3 A 3 for any pair k ∈ (0, 1) and any ε ∈ [−1, ∞) implies RP (X) ≥ 2 for any X > 0.
A comment similar to the one made for risk aversion applies for prudence.
When the sure loss and the zero-mean risk are additive, positive prudence (u ′′′ > 0) implies a preference for harm disaggregation. However, in the multiplicative case the condition is more demanding: the preference for harm disaggregation requires that prudence be strong enough (RP ≥ 2).
An interesting interpretation of proposition 2 can again be given through
In an EU framework with a logarithmic utility, A 3 ∼ B 3 since
In this case, the better apportionment in B 3 is exactly compensated for by its higher variance of final wealth. If besides h ′ > 0 and h ′′ < 0, the transformation h also satisfies h ′′′ > 0, then RP exceeds 2 (see appendix) and again more weight is attached to the apportionment effect so that B 3 ≻ A 3 .
Before concluding, let us mention that the benchmark values of RRA and RP could also be related to a willingness to trade-off different moments of the lotteries. In the comparison between B 2 and A 2 , final wealth has not only a lower mean in B 2 but also a lower variance. As far as B 3 and A 3 are concerned, these lotteries yield the same expected final wealth but the higher variance of B 3 is compensated for by a lower skewness. In this paper, we have given a more fundamental interpretation of these benchmark values which is independent of the institutional environment in which the choice is made. This result has been obtained by applying to multiplicative risks the notion of risk apportionment that was used for additive risks in order to justify the alternating signs of successive derivatives of the vNM utility function.
Finally, we believe that the relatively simple nature of the lotteries involved should easily allow for an experimental determination of individual risk attitudes.
Appendix
Let us define function v(·) such as v (x) = h (ln x) with, for all y ∈ R, h ′ (y) > 0 and h ′′ (y) < 0. We then obtain v ′ (x) = h ′ (ln x) × 1 x , and
so that the coefficient of relative risk aversion becomes
Under h ′ (y) > 0 and h ′′ (y) < 0, RRA v necessarily exceeds unity.
Similarly, the coefficient of relative prudence is given by
Under h ′ (y) > 0, h ′′ (y) < 0 and h ′′′ (y) > 0, RP v necessarily exceeds two.
